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Constitutional Law and Constitutional History
L.H. LARuE*

T

I.

INTRODUCTION

of us who have been associated with the critical legal studies
(CLS) movement differ among ourselves as much as we have differed with the rest of the legal academy. When outsiders are present we
have formed our wagons in a circle and shot outward. When the outsiders leave the guns have been turned inward toward the center of the
circle.
One of the questions that has provoked my own factional ire is the
role of history in CLS scholarship. An examination of the written work
of CLS scholars reveals extraordinary differences in the degree to which
history is discussed, if at all. In those articles in which history is present,
the authors differ in the way that they use it. In spite of these differences,
however, there is a definite trend away from the use of history. As Mark
Tushnet has written, most of the recent work "is relentlessly ahistorical." 1 This current tendency toward making history irrelevant is disturbing to some of us within the CLS movement, so I am writing to
express my disaffection. Within the confines of this article, it would be
impossible to discuss the relevance of history to law in general. Consequently, I shall limit myself to constitutional law; the thesis is that constitutional law must be studied in the context of constitutional history.
I propose that the most important fact about any case is its date.
The plausibility of this assertion can be demonstrated through the following scenario. Suppose that there are four cases, two of which were decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1935, and two in 1965.
Suppose further that for each of the years, one is a commerce clause case
and the other a due process clause case. Does the commerce clause case
of 1935 have more in common with its parallel case in 1965, or with its
contemporaneous 1935 due process case?
HOSE

* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. I would like to thank Anthony Chase,
Wythe Holt, Toni Marie Massaro, John Henry Schlegel, and Mark Tushnet; their criticisms and
encouragement were invaluable.
1. Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies:An Introduction to its Origins and Underpinnings,36 J.LEG.

EDuc. 505, 512 (1986).
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In considering how to examine cases for similarity or dissimilarity,
one must start by comparing the general course of decisions in 1935 and
1965. In 1935, the conservative majority on the Supreme Court was waging war against the New Deal. In retrospect, we know that this attack
would fail within two years, marking one of the great divides in American constitutional law. In 1965 the Warren Court was at the peak of its
liberal activism. However, this too would pass. The civil rights coalition
was soon to be ripped apart by powerful inner tensions, and the country
as a whole would be riven by political disputes over the Vietnam War.
Rather than a sharp demarcation of the kind that occurred in 1937, there
was a gradual dissipation of energy throughout the late 1960s. At each of
these two very different times, a majority of the Supreme Court had a
definite ideology in which it was confident. Although my account is
surely incomplete, it is plausible to assert that a 1935 commerce clause
case will mesh more closely with a 1935 due process case than with a
commerce clause case of 1965. If we ask which is more important-the
type of case or its date-I would assert that the date is more significant.
How would one begin to test the hypothesis that the most important
fact in any case is its date? And if this hypothesis does prove to be accurate, what will be its consequences for pedagogy? I begin by addressing
the first question. I wish to demonstrate that putting cases into their historical context can reveal elements of constitutional law that are otherwise concealed. I shall do this by collocating three cases that are not
often brought together.
II.

USING HISTORY

Since my general thesis is that the most important fact about a case
is its date, and thus that comparing cases requires establishing their historical context, Part II of this article shall be devoted to demonstrating
how one might execute such a comparison. This demonstration is merely
an examplar, not a proof; a rigorous proof would extend beyond the
scope of this article. The examplar of how one might compare cases by
establishing their historical context will be presented in two steps. First,
three cases will be described and questions about their context will be
posed. Second, historical facts about the context will be presented, so
that the general thesis can be illustrated.
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Three Cases

One of the three cases is well known. In re Debs2 is often a staple in
courses in constitutional law and federal jurisdiction. Usually, it is studied for its implications regarding the commerce power and injunctions.
Spies v. Illinois3 is well known to a smaller group of scholars. Spies is the
first case in which counsel argued that the fourteenth amendment made
the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. The Court avoided deciding
this issue by holding that even if the Bill of Rights were applicable, there
would be no error in the particular case. Consequently, most scholars
who study the Bill of Rights view the case as marginal to their interests.
The last case is truly exotic. In Presser v. Illinois4 the Court placed a
restrictive interpretation upon the second amendment's right-to-beararms provisions. Since the second amendment is not taken seriously by
most scholars, the case is not widely read. It is enlightening to read all
three cases in the order in which they came before the Court: first
Presser,then Spies, followed by Debs.
Let us begin the collocation by noting the dates: 1886, 1887, and
1895, respectively. The three cases were heard by the Court within nine
years of each other. Second, each of the three cases originated in Chicago, Illinois. Finally, the individuals involved-Presser, Spies, and
Debs-were all labor union organizers. This occupational identity is not
irrelevant, for the background of each of these cases is a labor dispute.
To use Axistotelian terms, the dramas in question have the requisite
unities of time, place, and action. In Presser v. Illinois, Herman Presser
was indicted in the criminal court of Cook County on September 24,
1879 for violating the Military Code of the State of Illinois.5 Since it is
obvious that Presser is a civilian, the first element of the case that might
rouse one's curiosity is why the legislators placed the statute that he is
charged with violating in Illinois' Military Code. To a modem eye, the
substance of the law seems unremarkable: it simply prohibits the organization of private military companies. Few of us today would be surprised
by a statute outlawing private armies. The statute provides:
It shall not be lawful for any body of men whatever, other than the
regular organized volunteer militia of this state, and the troops of the
United States, to associate themselves together as a military company or
organization, or to drill or parade with arms in any city, or town, of this
2.
3.
4.
5.

In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887).
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
Id. at 253.
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state, without the license of the governor thereof, which license may at any
time be revoked.6
The statute goes on to enumerate exceptions, including one for "students
in educational institutions where military science is a part of the course
of instruction." It also provides "that nothing herein contained shall be
construed so as to prevent benevolent or social organizations from wearing swords." 7
To a modem eye, the statute appears unremarkable. However, if
read in its historical context, we must ask how it looked to individuals
living at the time it was enacted. Was the statute thought to be routine
and uncontroversial, or was it perceived as a departure from tradition?
What were the historical circumstances that provoked the legislature to
enact the statute in the first place? In answering these questions, I am
making certain assumptions about legislative behavior. Legislators tend
to react rather than plan. It is not often that legislators search out
problems and provide solutions for them. Even less frequently do legislators devote themselves to the creative imagination of future problems and
the provision of concrete plans to address these problems should they
ultimately arise. In short, most legislation is a response to current
problems. If this assumption is sound, then an historical reading of the
case requires that one ask what circumstances provoked the legislators
into passing this particular statute.
The facts of the case are sketchy, set out only by way of a bill of
exceptions. We are told that Herman Presser was thirty-one years old, a
citizen of the United States, a resident of Illinois, and a voter. The facts
then become more interesting. Presser belonged to a society called Lehrund-Wehr Verein, which is described as a corporation organized under
the general incorporation laws of Illinois.' Why is the name in German?
What might it have meant to those who chose the name? There is a brief
quotation from the certificate of association, which states that the corporation was organized "for the purpose of improving the mental and bodily condition of its members, so as to qualify them for the duties of
citizens of a republic. Its members shall therefore obtain, in the meetings
of the association, a knowledge of our laws and political economy, and
shall also be instructed in military and gymnastic exercises." 9 We are
also told that Presser marched at the head of a company of four hundred
6. Id. at 253-54.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 254.
9. Id.
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men in the streets of Chicago. The company was armed with rifles and
Presser rode on horseback carrying a cavalry sword. These acts were alleged to be unlawful under Illinois law.10
An essential step in any historical reading of a case is an examination of how the legal issues were framed by counsel and addressed by the
court. One must be alert to the possibility that the issues in a case were
understood differently in their historical context, and may well have different meanings today. Interestingly, defendant's counsel in Presser
started with a preemption argument.1" There existed Congressional statutes delineating how the militia should be organized, and counsel pointed
out the ways in which the Military Code of Illinois departed from the
federal command. In response Justice Woods, speaking for a unanimous
bench, conceded the main point but avoided the conclusion. Although
the Illinois statute, read as a whole, did not comply with the federal mandate, Justice Woods asserted that the section in question was separable.
Thus, its validity did not depend on the legitimacy of the entire code. 2
To the modem reader, this move seems unexceptional although the actual content of Woods' argument is thin. There is no discussion in the
opinion of the rationale of the federal statute, or why it was written as it
was. Similarly, the opinion is silent on the same questions regarding the
Illinois statute. Consequently, Justice Woods' severability argument is
rather abstract. It is possible that Woods could be correct, but he offers
so little substantive support, that his argument remains unpersuasive.
Counsel's next argument was grounded in the second amendment,
but it was structured in an unusual way. Counsel did not argue for a
"right to keep and bear arms" as a simple individual right. Instead, the
right as argued for by counsel was more corporate than individual. It was
asserted that citizens have the right to be part of a militia and that the
Illinois statute interfered with that right. The textual hook from which
counsel hung the argument was the privileges and immunities clause of
the fourteenth amendment, but unlike modem uses of that clause, it did
not assert an individual right within our current understanding of that
phrase. Justice Woods rejected this argument in conclusory fashion.13 In
particular, he gave no discussion of the historical understandings of the
several provisions in the Constitution relating to the militia. The historical sources might have displayed a general perception that participation
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id. at 255-56.
Id. at 263-64.
Id. at 266.
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in the militia was like participation in the jury: both an obligation and a
privilege of citizenship. 4 Instead, Woods seemed to regard the Constitutional provisions as creating no privileges or claims for citizens, but
merely as recognizing powers in the state. The historical question is
whose argument was more traditional-that of defendant's counsel or
that of the Justices?
Counsel for Presser seems to have conceded the state's power to regulate and control, but he argued that this power should not be exercised
so as to destroy all citizen privileges. The most interesting feature of
Woods' opinion is that counsel's argument led him to write: "To deny
the power [to regulate and control] would be to deny the right of the
state to disperse assemblages organized for sedition and treason, and the
right to suppress armed mobs bent on riot and rapine.""5 This passage
raises an interesting historical question: why did Woods think that the
threat of "riot and rapine" was relevant to the issue before him?
The next case in the series is Spies v. Illinois.I6 On first reading, Spies
is opaque. A modem reader is not likely to understand it well if limited
to the information provided in the United States Reporter. For example,
the case nowhere identifies the crime with which August Spies is
charged. We are told that it is an offense punishable by death and that he
has been found guilty,' 7 but we know nothing about the precise charges.
Moreover, nothing is mentioned regarding evidence tending to prove
guilt or innocence. The reported facts deal solely with procedural issues,
and offer no information about the substantive context in which they
arose.
Another element likely to strike a modem reader as unfamiliar is the
procedure that was used. A petition was submitted for a writ of error,1 8 a
device not commonly used today. Consequently, many contemporary
14. Counsel stated that the historically sanctioned institution of the militia was characterized by
"distribution, rotation and lot." Brief for appellant at 18, Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
These terms were explained by counsel as follows: "That is to say, the militia was to be distributed
over the entire realm, or rather, recruited from every county of the kingdom; the inhabitants were to
serve in rotation; and the men to be selected by lot." Id. This description is drawn from Blackstone,
as a reading of Chapter 13 of Volume I of his famous "Commentaries on the Laws of England" will
make clear. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 412 (Ist ed. 1803).
Given this historical understanding, the Illinois scheme was especially objectionable. A voluntary
militia force, subject to the Governor's discretion, could be understood as an open invitation to
executive usurpation of power.
15. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. at 268.
16. 123 U.S. 131 (1887).
17. Id. at 132.
18. Id.
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readers may not be familiar with its contours or the types of issues that it
raises. Additionally, the sequence of particular events in the case seems
remarkable. The petition was presented on the 21st of October to Justice
Harlan in chambers.19 Harlan did not act on it, but arranged for the
petition to be presented to the entire Court. We are told that counsel
presented the petition on the 21st and argued in support of it on that
same day. 20 The Court did not rule, but took the petition under advisement. On the 24th of October, the Chief Justice announced that the
Court had not determined whether a writ of error should be issued, and
requested another argument on that point.2" On the 27th and 28th of
October counsel made oral argument for the second time.2 On the 2nd
of November 3 Chief Justice Waite delivered an opinion in which the
Court announced that it would not issue a writ of error to the Supreme
Court of Illinois.
The whys and wherefores of this procedure are questions that are
unanswered by the report. Furthermore, the content of Chief Justice
Waite's opinion is also a puzzle, since it does not seem to respond fairly
to counsel's argument. In argument, counsel asserted that the writ of
error should issue on the grounds that a question as to whether an individual's rights were denied was established by the record. This question
is, of course, distinct from the question of the merits of the case. Furthermore, this distinction was clearly articulated in counsel's argument. The
reporter's statement presents Mr. Tucker's argument in the following
terms:
We ask to be heard in order to obtain a reversal. Hearing must precede
afirmance or reversal. To discuss the merits in order to show our right to a
writ, is not only premature, but a denial of the right of appeal. Here is the
record of two millions of words. It is unprinted. Counsel have not readcannot read it. The Court has not done so-could not have done so. In the
dark, we pray an appeal, because we say the Constitution condemns our
condemnation. Can we in this condition be expected to prove that the
judgement should be reversed, when we only ask to have a chance to print
the record and show the injustice done to us, upon which in which injustice
we claim the writ? If granted, we will on hearing establish our right to
reverse the judgement.24
In spite of this eloquent plea, Chief Justice Waite's ruling appears to
19. Id. at 142.
20. Id. at 143.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 131.
24. Id. at 155.
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reach the merits. As printed, Waite's opinion is nineteen pages long.25
The first several pages are routine perfunctory matters that say nothing
of substance. Waite then devoted three pages26 to discussing the Illinois
statute that governs challenges for cause on the grounds of prejudice, and
he held that the statute was not unconstitutional on its face. He proceeded to discuss the grounds on which two jurors were challenged in
order to determine whether the administration of the statute denied constitutional rights. His discussion of these two jurors extends for ten
pages27 and constitutes the bulk of his opinion. In these ten pages, he
concluded that rights were not denied. The final three pages of the opinion deal with an issue regarding cross-examination and another minor
point in a summary fashion.
One wonders why Chief Justice Waite did in fact reach the merits of
the case, and further, why he used disagreement with the merits as
grounds for declaring that a writ should not issue in the first place. If
Waite was to decide the merits it is curious that the two particular jurors
were considered so crucial. Counsel said that the record had not yet been
printed and that he had not yet read it all. On the face of it, it seems
unfair for Waite to pick out two particular jurors as crucial to the petitioner's claim. Presumably, counsel mentioned these jurors as a "for example" during the course of argument. However, it is at least possible, if
not probable, that had counsel been able to present the question of jury
prejudice on the basis of a full printed record, then his case would have
been stronger.
Aside from the adequacy of Waite's discussion of the jury question,
the opinion does not deal with all of the issues pertaining to the writ of
error. The reporter's statement of the petition for the writ displays a substantial list of errors.2 8 Counsel's argument is limited to only a few of
them, 29 and Chief Justice Waite's opinion discusses fewer still. If this
were a normal appeal, there would be nothing uncommon about this. We
would see the process of moving from the initial filing to the final opinion
25. Id. at 163-82.
26. Id. at 167-70.
27. Id. at 170-80.
28. Id. at 134-41. In addition to the points mentioned in the text, the petition alleged
prosecutorial misconduct consisting of unsustained charges and vituperation, prosecutorial reference
to failure to testify, illegal searches and seizures, an instruction that authorized conviction as an
aider and abettor for merely giving a public speech, and that the panel from which the jurors were to
be selected was purposefully summoned so as to exclude wage laborers.
29. Id. at 143-55. John Randolph Tucker's argument for petitioners focused mainly on the proposition that the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment made the Bill of
Rights applicable to the States.
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as one by which the issues were winnowed out and narrowed down.
However, given the extremely short time span between presentation of
the petition and issuance of the Court's decision, combined with the lack
of a printed record, the Court's drastic curtailment of issues addressed
can only be regarded as careless practice.
All of this raises the question of the significance of historical context
in its sharpest form. Why was there such haste? Why was the record so
lengthy? Why did the Court decide thd merits .without ever granting
counsel a chance to argue the merits?
The Debs3 ° case is probably the easiest of the three for a modem
reader to approach, which may explain why it is used in modem
casebooks. The reporter's statement of facts summarizes the content of
the bill in equity filed by the United States.3 1 Since the bill purports to
state the facts that justify the issuance of an injunction, a more thorough
factual description is provided here than was offered in either Presseror
Spies. More complete, however, does not necessarily mean that it is more
adequate. It is possible to read the allegations of the bill and accept them
at their face value, in which case there is no need for further historical
information. However, a careful historical reading mandates an inquiry
into the accuracy of the allegations.
The opinion of Justice Brewer begins on a routine note. The opening
of Brewer's opinion is devoted to expounding the powers of the national
government over interstate commerce and the post office system.32
Brewer stated the power in sweeping terms, and it is in precisely such
terms that we understand these powers today.
An aspect of the opinion likely to arouse curiosity appears after
about five pages when Brewer switches from a discussion of the general
nature of the power over commerce and the mails to the issue of the
appropriate means for executing these powers. Having established to his
satisfaction that Congress has sweeping power over interstate commerce
and transportation of the mails, and that this power authorizes the national government to prevent any unlawful or forceable interference with
commerce or mail, Justice Brewer proceeded to the topic of appropriate
sanctions against acts of obstruction. As Brewer put it:
Doubtless, it is within the competency of Congress to prescribe by legislation that any interference with these matters shall be offenses against the
United States, and prosecuted and punished by indictment in the proper
30.
31.
32.

In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
Id. at 565-70.
Id. at 578-81.
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courts. But is that the only remedy? Have the vast interest of the nation in
interstate commerce, and in the transportation of the mails, no other pro33
tection than lies in the possible punishmenf of those who interfere with it?
Brewer thought the answer to this question was clearly "no". Modem
readers are apt to agree given, for example, the importance of the regulatory fimctions of administrative agencies. However, the train of associations that such sentences are likely to generate within us are very
different from those elicited within Brewer.
To Brewer, the question of whether Congress was limited to enacting legislation against criminal activity called up the jury trial provisions
of article III.3 He explained the relevance of the provisions as follows:
If all the inhabitants of a state, or even a great body of them, should combine to obstruct interstate commerce or the transportation of the mails,
prosecutions for such offenses had in such a community would be doomed
in advance to failure. And if the certainty of such failure was known, and
the national government had no other way to enforce the freedom of the
interstate commerce and the transportation of the mail than by prosecution
and punishment for interference therewith the whole interest of the nation
in these respects would be at the absolute mercy of a portion of the inhabitants of that single state.3 5
This proposition is startling not because of its content, but because of its
presumed relevance. Why did the historical context of the case provoke
such a train of associations?
Brewer then escalated the dispute further:
But there is no such impotency in the national government. The entire
strength of the nation may be used to enforce in any part of the land the full
and free exercise of all national powers and the security of all rights entrusted by the Constitution to its care. The strong arm of the national government may be put forth to brush away all obstructions to the freedom of
interstate commerce or the transportation of the mails. If the emergency
arises, the army of the nation, and all its militia are at the service of the
nation to compel obedience to its laws.3 6
This rhetorical escalation is historically significant. The question of
alternatives to criminal law, which in our day might provoke by train of
association the thought of administrative agencies, instead has provoked
in Justice Brewer an entirely different set of associations. For him, it led
to thoughts of jury nullifications and armed conflict. Justice Brewer tried
33. Id. at 581.
34. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
35. Id. at 581-82.
36. Id. at 582.
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to find an alternative to these stark choices. In two rather sweeping rhetorical questions, he asked:
[I]s there no other alternative than the use of force on the part of the executive authorities whenever obstructions arise to the freedom of interstate
commerce or the transportation of the mail? Is the army the only instrument by which rights
of the public can be enforced and the peace of the
37
nation preserved?
At this point, the intended negative response to these questions is fairly
obvious, and the opinion now marches toward its destination with efficiency. When a judge asks questions like these, one knows what the answer will be, and it is unlikely that the remainder of the opinion will be
other than marginally surprising.
What is intriguing about the opinion at this point is its sudden
switch to formalism. More precisely, Brewer's oscillation between impassioned rhetorical questions and legal formalism is curious. The first case
cited after the rhetorical questions is a Connecticut state court case in
which the borough of Stamford asked for an injunction to restrain the
Stamford Horse Railroad Company from laying down tracks in the
streets.3" In that case, the court acknowledged that the borough had the
right to use self-help remedies and rip up the tracks. However, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the existence of this self-help right did
not bar the borough of Stamford from seeking an injunction. To be sure,
one is entitled to an injunction only if there is no adequate remedy at law,
but self-help via force is not the sort of adequate legal remedy contemplated by this rule. Brewer's argument is sound, but in this context, it
seems droll because of the incongruity of collocating the activities of
Stamford Horse Railroad and those of Eugene Debs.
Conceding that the imposition of an injunction was a possible remedy, the question then became whether the United States had "such an
interest in the subject-matter as enables it to appear as party plaintiff in
this suit."3 9 Today, the concept of standing would be used to address this
issue, although the answer to the question would still be "yes". Counsel
argued that "equity only interferes for the protection of property, and...
the government has no property interest."'' Brewer replied straightforwardly that the United States did, indeed, have a property interest in the
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 583.

Id.
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mails.4 1 Under the strictest view of property law, this is surely true.
Under traditional classifications, we would say that the government is a
bailee of the mail, and that a right to possession is a property interest.
However, Justice Brewer did not rest upon this ground. He delivered a nine and one-half page disquisition on the relevant law of "public
nuisance" versus "private nuisance" and argued that the precedents permit the government to sue.42 The only thing that would strike a modern
reader as curious, one imagines, is that Justice Brewer spent so many
pages on it.
Having decided that the available alternative of force does not foreclose equity, and that the United States has standing, Brewer then moved
to the "unquestioned" proposition "that it is outside of the jurisdiction of
a court of equity to enjoin the commission of crimes." 43 Although he
conceded the truth of the proposition, he tried to avoid its relevance
through the classic technique of slicing apart the unsliceable. While it is
true that the chancellor cannot enjoin a crime, it is also true that the
chancellor can protect an interest that is protectable in equity.'
This
will result in what appears to be concurrent jurisdiction, but it is concurrent over different aspects of the same transaction. The criminal courts
will be acting with the purpose of punishment, and the civil courts with
the purpose of protection.
This distinction, of course, created the appearance that the contempt power of the chancellor was being used to circumvent the jury trial
guarantee. Brewer stoutly denied this motive, citing numerous authorities affirming the power of a tribunal to punish for the contempt of its
orders. He even cited precedents which prohibited the delegation of the
power to punish contempts to another tribunal. Brewer cited4 5 In re
Yates,4 6 in which Chief Justice Kent of the New York State Supreme
Court of Judicature discussed In re Anthony Earl of Shaftsbury. 47 In
Shaftsbury, the King's Bench held that it could not punish for contempt
before the House of Lords as the latter was the sole judge of contempts
arising before it. By analogy, Brewer concluded that the chancellor must
not defer to a jury. The analogy, at best, is strained.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 581-82.

43. Id. at 593.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 595.
In re Yates, 4 Johns. 317, 369 (1809).
In re Earl of Shaftsbury, 6 Howell's State Trials 1269 (29 Charles I 1677).

1987]

LAW AND HISTORY

Brewer next cited that part of counsel's brief which attempted to
distinguish all of these cases. Counsel argued:
No case can be cited where such a bill in behalf of the sovereign has been
entertained against riot and mob violence, though occurring on the highway. It is not such fitful and temporary obstruction that constitutes a nuisance. The strong hand4 8of executive power is required to deal with such
lawless demonstrations.
In reply Justice Brewer wrote: "We do not perceive that this argument
questions the jurisdiction of the court, but only the expediency of the
action of the government in applying for its process." 49 Brewer thought
the objection could not apply to the jurisdictional question since he did
not see how a court could have jurisdiction to enjoin one person, but lose
jurisdiction when the obstruction was caused by a hundred persons.5 0 In
the latter case, however, it is questionable whether "in the excitement of
passion a mob will pay heed to processes issued from the courts."5 1
Brewer cited with approval a point made by counsel in oral argument
"that it would savour somewhat of the puerile and ridiculous to have
read a writ of injunction to Lee's army during the late Civil War."2
Brewer exploited this argument to buttress his conclusion. He asked
"[B]ut does not counsel's argument imply too much? Is it to be assumed
that these defendants were conducting a rebellion or inaugurating a
revolution, and that they and their associates were thus placing themselves beyond the reach of the civil process of the courts?" 53 Justice
Brewer thought the answer to this was "no," supporting his contention
with testimony given by one of the defendants before the United States
strike commission:
As soon as the employees found that we were arrested, and taken from the
scene of action, they became demoralized, and that ended the strike. It was
not the soldiers that ended the strike. It was not the old brotherhoods that
ended the strike. It was simply the United States courts that ended the
strike. Our men were in a position that never would have been shaken,
under any circumstances, if we had been permitted to remain upon the field
among them. Once we were taken from the scene of action, and restrained
48. In re Debs, 158 U.S. at 596.
49. Id. at 597.
50. We have proof here, if any is needed, that Justice Brewer would not accept Engels' version
of dialectical materialism. The maxim that a difference in quantity can yield a difference in quality is
rejected by him here. Of course, there are other reasons for concluding that Justice Brewer is not a
partisan of Engels.
51. In re Debs, 158 U.S. at 597.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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from sending telegrams or issuing orders or answering questions, then the
minions of the corporations would be put to work ....

Our headquarters

were temporarily demoralized and abandoned, and we could not answer
any messages. The men went back to work, and the ranks were broken, and
the strike was broken up....

not by the army, and not by any other power,

but simply and solely by the action of the United States courts in restraining us from
54 discharging our duties as officers and representatives of
our employees.
This particular quotation raises a profound question regarding historical context. It is remarkable that Justice Brewer used this excerpt to
support the position which he was arguing. He had said that the legal
question was merely one of "expediency," and the passage cited established to Brewer's satisfaction that the injunction served this purpose in
ending the obstruction to interstate commerce. This part of the opinion
displays a bland self-confidence which suggests Brewer believed that the
ends justified the means. Or could this passage be read differently?
Might the show of confidence conceal an underlying insecurity?
The next quotation does not convey the same sense self-confidence.
Indeed, its tone of excess may be construed as evidence of insecurity.
Brewer cautions that
"[it] must be borne in mind that this bill was not simply to enjoin a mob
and mob violence. It was not a bill to command a keeping of the peace;
much less was its purport to restrain the defendants from abandoning
whatever employment they were engaged in. The right of any laborer, or
any number of laborers, to quit work was not challenged." 55
Having explained what the bill was not intended to do, Brewer clarified
his perception of its purpose by stating that "[t]he scope and purpose of
the bill was only to restrain forceable obstructions of the highways along
which interstate commerce travels and the mails are carried." 56 Can
these statements be accepted at face value?
III.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The setting of our three cases is post-Civil War Chicago, a rapidly
growing city well on its way to becoming to a major metropolis.5 7 It was
also a city of booms and busts. The Great Fire of 1871 was followed by
boom times as the city went about the task of rebuilding. But in 1873, the
54. Id. at 597-98.
55. Id. at 598.
56. Id.
57. Nearly any standard history will give the broad outlines. I recommend D. BURNER, F.
McDONALD, & E. GENOVESE, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 318-87, 422-28 (1980).
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entire country entered a severe depression that would last for at least five
years. The depression caused great hardship. Workers faced wage cuts
58
and layoffs, and many people were starving.
This downturn was not met with quiet despair, however. There
emerged a rash of labor union organizing and political agitation. One of
the most significant of these events was the Great Strike of 1877.1 9 It
began on July 16th, when the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad announced a
ten percent cut in wages. The strike spread across the country, first paralyzing transportation in the East, then moving to the Midwest and finally
reaching the West Coast. Eventually, it went beyond the railroads and
became a general strike.
Whether or not the strike posed a serious threat to the security of
life and property, there is no doubt that those who were in power were
alarmed. The newspapers called for ruthless suppression of the strike,
and public officials were more than willing to comply." The police, the
state militia, and federal troops were used against the strikers. Much
blood was shed, primarily that of the strikers.6 Eventually the strike was
broken, and political positions became polarized. Fear and anger were
augmented on both sides, and each faction had members who called for
the use of arms.6 2 It is against this historical background that Presser
must be read.
In the aftermath of the Great Strike of 1877, most people were interested in moderate solutions. Nevertheless, in the days after the strike
militants gained power that was disproportionate to their number. Both
factions were permeated with individuals whose radical proposals gained
influence. On the side of labor, the practical manifestation of this was the
organization of "self-defense" associations. For example, the militants
among German-speaking workers organized the Lehr-und-Wehr Verein,
and the Irish organized the Irish Labor Guards.6" In 1879, the Illinois
legislature responded passing the statute that was contested in Presser.
In the years between Presser and Spies, there were intense factional
58. For background on the situation in Chicago at this time, and for a discussion that links the
circumstances to the Spies case, see P. AVRICH, THE HAYMARKET TRAGEDY 150-59 (1984).
59. For a general account of the strike and its consequences see P. FONER, THE GREAT LABOR
UPRISING OF 1877 (1977) (examining labor activities generally, circa 1877).
60. P. AVRICH, supra note 58, at 27.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 34-38.
63. P. AVRICH, supranote 58, at 45-46, 161-62 (discussing the formation of self-defense groups).
August Spies, who gave his name to the second case in my trilogy, also joined the Lehr- und-Wehr
Verein. Id. at 122.
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splits within the labor movement. It is evident that the defendants in
Spies were not the architects of the events leading to their trial. The eight
defendants in Spies were adherents of the so-called Anarchist movement."4 They proposed a total destruction of the capitalist system, and
they scorned the Socialist movement as too authoritarian and as too
prone to compromise. However, most of organized labor had begun a
program of agitation for an eight-hour day. The anarchists were scornful
of this proposal, but it was so popular among the workers that they had
to join or risk losing all connection with the majority of industrial
workers.65
The eight-hour day movement was provoked by the hard times of
1883-86, and spawned widespread labor agitation. One way in which the
agitation took shape was through strikes. A strike at the Cyrus McCormick 66 factory led to the Spies case. In April of 1885, McCormick was
forced to restore a fifteen percent wage cut after a bitter strike. He resolved to break the union, and in February of 1886, declared a general
lockout and brought in nonunion labor.67
For the next several months pickets and violence were routine at the
McCormick plant. Although the anarchists supported the strikers, they
did not direct the pickets. However, when the violence became particularly bad on May 3, 1886, the leaders of the anarchists responded with a
call for a mass rally to be held the next day at Haymarket Square. Fewer
workers participated than had been anticipated, and the rally itself was
peaceful. The mayor of Chicago, Carter Harrison, did what he could to
ease tensions by appearing at the rally.68 Speeches began at about 8:30
p.m. By ten o'clock, the mayor was convinced there was no risk of disorder and went home. About fifteen minutes later, Police Inspector Bonfield decided to break up the meeting, and he marched his men into
Haymarket Square from a nearby precinct station. When Bonfield demanded that the speaker step down, he complied-but a bomb was
thrown into the police ranks.69
The casualties were appalling. At least seven policemen died and
64. See generally id. (containing a fresh appraisal of the events surrounding the Haymarket
Tragedy).
65. Id. at 181-85.
66. This enterprise was the predecessor of International Harvester.
67. P. AvRcIH, supra note 58, at 188.
68. He reportedly made himself conspicuous by striking match after match as though he was
relighting his cigar.
69.

P. AVRICH, supra note 58, at 197-208; see also W. ADELMAN, HAYMARKET REVISITED

(1976) (a brief and popular account of the Haymarket events).
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sixty were wounded, although the evidence indicates that a majority of
the police casualties were caused by bullets from police revolvers. The
number of civilian casualties were comparable to the those suffered by
the law enforcement officers and were entirely caused by police gunshots.7" The reaction which followed included press hysteria, police repression, and a farcical trial. The individual who actually threw the
bomb was never identified. Each of the eight defendants in the Spies trial
had an airtight alibi. The charge against them was conspiracy. The judge
instructed the jury that if they believed the defendants had made
speeches or written pamphlets that encouraged terrorist acts, and if they
further believed that a murder was committed by someone who was induced to act by this advice, then the defendants were guilty, even if the
murderer had never been identified.7 1 The verdict of guilty was pronounced on August 20, 1886. On the second day of November, Chief
Justice Waite delivered his opinion.
The last case in this triad, In re Debs, arose from the Pullman railroad strike of 1894. As was the earlier strike at McCormick's factory,
this action was provoked by wage cuts. 72 This time, the strikers' strategy
was to broaden the strike within the industry. They wanted to put pressure on Pullman by cutting off his access to the railroads, thereby
preventing Pullman cars from earning their customary fees. The Pullman
strikers persuaded the railway union not to run trains to which Pullman
cars were attached. This cooperation led to widespread sympathy
strikes. 73 The Attorney General of the United States secured an injunction against interference with commerce and the mails, and called in
troops to enforce it. The presence of the troops outraged the strikers,
who reacted with violence. The novel twist in this scenario was that the
violence was treated as contempt of court. 74 Justice Brewer sustained the
contempt conviction.
An understanding of the historical context in which these cases
arose illuminates many points which would otherwise remain obscure. In
light of this context, it is understandable why in Presser Justice Woods
said: "To deny the power [to outlaw the Lehr-und-Wehr Verein] would
70. P. AVRICH, supra note 58, at 208-10.
71. Id. at 260-93. For a more thorough discussion of the trial see A. DAVID, THE HISTORY OF
THE HAYMARKET AFFAIR 236-392 (1958).
72. For a contemporaneous account, see W. CARWARDING, THE PULLMAN STRIKE (1894); see

also W. ADELMAN, TOURING PULLMAN (1977) (detailing social background of the community).
73. A. LINDSEY, THE PULLMAN STRIKE 133-35 (1964).
74. See N. SALVATORE, EUGENE V. DEBS: CITIZEN AND SOCIALIST 126-39 (1982) (detailing
Debs' role in the affair).
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be to deny the right of the state to disperse assemblages organized for
sedition and treason, and the right to suppress armed mobs bent on riot
and rapine." 7 5 We can understand why Chief Justice Waite in Spies decided the merits without giving a hearing on the merits. 76 We can understand why Justice Brewer in Debs thought in terms of jury nullification
and armed conflict.7 7 Most of all, the context leads us away from excessive legalism. The history enables us to understand what everyone understood at the time-fundamental questions of social, political and
economic power were at stake. Surely the judges understood this fact. As
evidence, I offer the following letter, which was written by a Supreme
Court Justice to the judge who had held Debs in contempt:
Justice J.M. Harlan to Judge W.A. Woods
Washington, D.C.
May 28, 1895
Dear Judge:
As soon as the opinion in the Debs case is printed I will send you a
copy. The authority of the Circuit Court to do what it did in the contempt
case is fully sustained. The opinion does not discuss the facts, but finds that
there was jurisdiction, and jurisdiction existing, the action of the Circuit
Court could not, in the matter of contempt, be reviewed on Habeas Corpus.
Now, a thought has come into my mind today which I deem important. It is this: The main suit by the Govt. in which the injunction issued
was new in all its aspects. Many lawyers, I take it, doubted whether the
Govt. had any standing in such a suit to invoke the authority of a court of
equity. The jurisdiction of the court has been sustained, and the authority
of the U.S. in such matters is hereafter to be recognized as equal to any
emergency, involving the freedom of interstate commerce or the unobstructed transportation of the mails. No such disturbance as that raised by
Debs is likely to arise again in this country. If Debs and his companions
remain in jail during the summer, are they not likely to be regarded as
martyrs by a large number of people? Cannot the U.S. afford to say- cannot the U.S. court afford to say-as the authority of the Govt. and the
courts is fully sustained .. [and] everybody [will know] in advance the peril
they will incur, by disobeying the order of court, -that the pending prosecutions may be stopped, and the proceedings for contempt dismissed or set
aside. I take it that you could, if you saw proper, set aside the order fining
and imprisoning and discharge the parties in contempt. I assume that the
attorneys of Debs could so arrange the matter as to justify the court in
being liberal. Recent events, as it seems to me, suggest that there may be
wisdom in such a course. A construction of the Constitution which so narrows the power of the Genl. Government that, practically, it cannot compel
75.
76.

Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 268 (1886).
See Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 163-82 (1887).

77. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 577-600 (1895).
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rich landlords and the owners of invested property, to contribute to the
support of the nation, and a construction so broad as that given in the Debs
case, will not be understood by vast masses of people. The situation is one
that is well calculated to increase the spirit of unrest and discontent in
many parts, indeed, throughout all, of the country. I believe the generous
action upon the part of the Govt. and the courts, at this time, would be of
real service to this country....
Think of this, without consulting any one-for consultation may raise
false hopes-and let me know your views. If you do not concur, I will not
move in the matter. If you think well of the suggestion, I will bring the
matter to the attention of the Attorney-General and ascertain his views....
Altogether you are to be congratulated-all the more because you
made your way without any help from the Circuit Justice [Harlan] who,
under
ordinary circumstances would have been glad to have conferred with
78
you.

The lesson of this letter is the same as that of the cases. However,
the letter does reveal something that is not mentioned in the case it discusses. Harlan was astute enough to see that it was unwise to make a
martyr of Debs, and we would not expect to see such frank calculations
in the United States Reports. Harlan also makes clear that the fundamental issue is controlling any "disturbance [such] as that raised by Debs,"
so that the social order is not disturbed.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

What are the implications of the above? The three cases do not seem
to have much to do with each other when they are read for their legal
doctrine, but when one reads them in their historical context, they are
obviously connected. If we assume that this sort of demonstration could
be repeated with other cases, then what follows? I would like to suggest
that the implications are great, both for pedagogy and scholarship, and
furthermore, that historical analysis should lead one to be suspicious not
only of mainstream work but of the work of those associated with CLS.
Let me now turn a discussion of what these implications might be.
A.

Pedagogy

Several lessons can be learned from the three cases discussed. One
such lesson concerns pedagogy. The tangible evidence of our pedagogy
takes two forms-the preparation of .teaching materials and classroom
performance. If one takes seriously the lesson of the three cases-that
78. Westin, The First JusticeHarlan:A Self-PortraitFrom His Private Papers46 Ky. L. J. 321,
359-60 (1958).
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one can only understand cases by putting them in their historical context-then certain changes must be made both in the way teaching
materials are constructed and in the manner in which classes are taught.
Consider the casebook, for example. If one is convinced by the argument of this essay, then one would print the cases in a casebook in chronological order. Unless cases are printed in chronological order, it is
exceedingly difficult to see a particular case in the context of contemporaneous cases. Many teachers would object on the ground that they prefer
to pursue themes. However, one can continue to pursue broad themes
even if the cases are presented chronologically simply by flipping back
and forth among different sections in the book. After all, the codex form
of bookbinding was developed for the specific purpose of enabling the
reader to flip back and forth between different sections of the book with
ease.

79

I do not find it difficult to assemble cases in chronological order
since I prefer to teach cases chronologically. However, I do not follow
this technique slavishly. For particular purposes and in the interest of
variety I often transgress chronological lines. However, when I do so, I
prefer that the casebook be constructed so that this technique is clear.
The student should always be aware which cases occurred before, and
which occurred after, the case that is being read.
How can one teach historically in the classroom? All law professors
are subject to the pressures and expectations generated within the law
school environment, including the practice of colleagues and the expectations of students. Anyone who is too critical, theoretical, or historical,
will face opposition. How is it possible to teach historically in the face of
these pressures?
My own solution is to focus on the relationship between cases and
precedent. For any case, I may ask, "What sort of precedent does this
case establish?" For older cases, the questions can be, "Is this case still a
good precedent? And if so, for what?" For more recent cases, one can
ask, "What does this case do to the prior precedents?" The advantage of
focusing on these questions is that it allows the building of a bridge be79. Originally, the several leaves of a book were glued together at their edges so as to make a
scroll. A scroll can be consulted only by unrolling it, which forces on the reader a sequential search
and reading procedure. Once upon a time in the ancient world, someone had the bright idea of
assembling the several leaves by way of sewing them together along a single edge, rather than gluing
them together into a scroll. This invention is called the codex form of bookbinding, and it permits
the random access form of search, as distinguished from the purely sequential form of search. See
generally C. ROBERTS & T. SKEAT, THE BIRTH OF CODEX (1983) for a recent and thorough monograph on the development of the codex form of bookbinding.
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tween the historical and the technical. The historical questions relate to
continuity and discontinuity. The history of American constitutional law
includes both, and asking what effect recent caselaw has on older precedents is one way of addressing that historical question. At the same time,
it has the advantage of being a technical and practical question. The
practicing attorney is interested in how caselaw can be used in legal practice. Is it still good law? Can it be relied upon? In other words, the general pressure on law schools to be trade schools should not impede the
teaching of constitutional law in an historical manner. The historical
questions of continuity and discontinuity overlap nicely with the narrowly professional, trade-oriented question of the precedential value of
caselaw.
However, there is another pressure in law school with which the
historical method is radically inconsistent. Although law as a trade is no
impediment, law as a religion is. There are those who think of law, and
particularly constitutional law, as a religion. As a sociological generalization, the place of constitutional law in the "civil religion" of the United
States is well documented.8 0 Focusing on discontinuity as well as continuity is upsetting to some, although not all, true believers.
B.

ConstitutionalLaw and CriticalLegal Studies

Ironically, the historical method is also disturbingly inconsistent
with the actual performance of most of those who are CLS adherents.
Many CLS scholars do not see constitutional law as a set of precedents.
They share with their mainstream opponents the notion that constitutional law rests on a finite set of principles. They differ in that they see
those principles as being indeterminate and contradictory. The principle
task of many CLS professors involves reading a set of cases so as to recover their underlying principles, then demonstrating the principles to be
indeterminate and contradictory. The historical approach condemns that
entire process as irrelevant. For the historicist, one merely has a set of
texts including the Constitution itself, certain statutes that have canonical force, 8 a collection of Supreme Court opinions, and perhaps other
documents such as the Declaration of Independence, the Lincoln-Douglas debates,82 or the writings of John Stuart Mill on liberty.83 In addition
80.
81.
review
82.
83.

See, ag., R. BELLAH & P. HAMMOND, VARIETIES OF CIVIL RELIGION (1980).
Title 28, U.S.C. § 1257 (1982), for example, establishes the Supreme Court's authority to
decisions made by the state judiciaries.
See H. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED (1959) (interpreting these debates).
J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (Great Britain 1859).
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to these texts, one has a social practice in which the texts are used and
construed as precedents. From the historical point of view, constitutional
law is a combination of texts and precedents which are used in a complex
historical practice, and the debate about determinate and harmonious
principles versus indeterminate and contradictory principles is irrelevant.
I do not mean to assert that principles and consistency are nonexistent or unimportant. What I do mean is that they are the product of
practice, rather than its foundation. More importantly, I think that contradictions among principles ultimately are unimportant. For the most
part people are used to living with inconsistency. For intellectuals, theorists, and ideologues, inconsistencies may pose problems. For most individuals, politicians, and judges, inconsistencies are often easily dismissed.
Furthermore, it is well established that people can behave in a predictable and coherent fashion, even when acting in a way that a theorist may
regard as logically inconsistent.84 It is important to bear in mind, however, that not all contradictions are equal.
The relativity of contradictions is important. Ideological and psychological contradictions are less important than structural ones. In the
three cases that I have discussed, the presence of something far more
significant than logical inconsistency among rules and principles is evident. In these cases, we see the structural contradictions of social classes.
Furthermore, we see judges struggling with these contradictions and attempting to maintain a social order that is threatened by questions of
class. Contradiction among classes is not the only structural contradiction in our polity, but I believe that it is the most fundamental
contradiction.
C. CriticalLegal Studies and History
I would like now to consider the relationship between the views expressed in this Article and other trends that have been associated with
the CLS movement. I will take as my starting point a recent article by
Mark Tushnet85 in which he presents a viewpoint against which I will
argue. Tushnet notes that social theory, as we have customarily known it,
has been rejected by a large number of those who are associated with
CLS. He says, "the renunciation of the theoretical dimension of the initial project of CLS helps explain an otherwise curious characteristic of
recent legal scholarship.... [It] is relentlessly ahistorical." 86 I agree with
84. See, e-g., PASCAL, PENSEES 60, 66, 210 (A. Krailsheirner trans. 1966).
85. See Tushnet, supra note 1.
86. Id. at 512.
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87
Tushnet's description, and I deplore this development.
Tushnet notes that this ahistoricism was not the original position
advanced by those connected with CLS. According to Tushnet, "[T]he
early position in CLS was that one could say something systematic about
the relation between legal rules and power-for example, we can say,
though with many qualifications, that the legal system is tilted in favor of
capitalism." 8 8 However, Tushnet asserts that these early views regarding
"tilt" have been rejected by the "dominant position" in CLS.8 9
Tushnet identifies three arguments against systematic theoretical
statements that "have been particularly effective." 90 Although the arguments may have been "effective," I have doubts as to their validity. An
interesting question of social psychology lurks behind the word "effective," and I will address this issue in due course.
The first argument that Tushnet says has been effective is one which
builds upon the legal realist's skepticism toward rules. Tushnet phrases
the argument as follows: "If decision-makers can in principle reach any
conclusion they wish within the legal system, 'the system' cannot be
tilted, though of course the decision-makers might be biased."9 In this
argument, the legal system is identified as the sum total of all the legal
rules which comprise the system. Given this starting place, together with
certain theses about indeterminacy of the rules and contradictions among
the rules, Tushnet concludes that the system is not tilted because it is not
coherent.
The problem with this first argument is that it assumes that law
equals rules. However, most historians and social theorists would reject
this assumption, as did the legal realists. At the very least, a legal realist
would say that the rules have their meaning via the precedents that apply
them. The essence of legal realism is to insist that rules as abstractions
are not very helpful. Consequently, the "dominant position," appears to
abandon legal realism altogether. Furthermore, the legal realists were in-

87. Tushnet neither praises nor blames. Although the tone of his prose may lead a reader to
assume that Tushnet approves of the recent trends in CLS, he nowhere commits himself. He states,
"I should probably note my guess that I am in the minority these days on most of the issue I will
mention." Id. at 510 n. 16. However, he does not identify which of the dominant positions he would
dissent from.
88. Id. at 511.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. The argument is curious, in that it purports to put any "tilt" or "bias" in the judge, not
the system, and thus to offer a psychological explanation that is extrinsic, not intrinsic, to the law.
However, the character of the judiciary is not an extrinsic fact. Judicial character should be understood as part of the tradition of judging, which is part of law.
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terested in what they called "law in action" which they distinguished
sharply from "law in the books." So long as one defines the legal system
as the law in action, then the argument that Tushnet reports as having
persuaded the majority seems both scholastic and irrelevant.
The second argument is summarized in the following sentence: "No
one has shown that any particular aspect of the legal system, or even the
legal system as a whole, serves the interest of capitalism better than do
obvious alternatives, including wholesale rejection of vast bodies of
law."9 2 This assertion is grounded in comparative law. A global survey of
law indicates that capitalism occurs in many different countries which
have widely divergent legal systems. As I interpret this argument, comparative law is being used to refute hypotheses that take the following
form: capitalism in the United States has produced the following [fill in
the blank] legal practices. The refutation is supposed to work by showing
that capitalism in France, for example, produced very different types of
legal practice.
Tushnet's argument is unpersuasive. Comparative law evidence refutes a particular sort of theory which might be called "perfect functionalism." By a theory of perfect functionalism, a system such as capitalism
would necessarily produce only those legal practices which are perfectly
functional with reference to it. However, a historical practice that is
grounded in social theory need not be wedded to perfect functionalism.
Social systems have generated practices and institutions that are pathological, poorly adapted, or merely imperfectly functional. Legal systems
have been produced by human action, and the actors produced what they
did based upon their own rather limited understanding of what was happening at the time and what was needed to address current problems.
Understanding can be distorted by fear, ignorance, desire, and countless
other factors. Most theories of history assume that human actors are not
omniscient, omnipotent, and benevolent. In some forms of theology the
deity is assumed to have these qualities. However, there ought to be a
distinction between social theory and theology.
On the other hand, the evidence of comparative law can be used to
make a different point: capitalism generates widely divergent legal systems so a uniform theoretical explanation is not possible. I cannot accept
this form of the argument from divergence because it confuses physical
theory with social theory. It would be surprising, indeed, if the capitalist
production of a certain chemical yielded a poison in Germany, but a
92.

Id.
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beneficial medicine in England. But it should be no surprise to learn that
the development of capitalism led to changes in the legal system of the
United States that differ from the changes that occurred in France. In
physical theory, variations in time and place are irrelevant. In social theory, time and place are relevant and often crucial. In social theory the
environment is always important. Just as the chemist must specify which
facts of the physical environment (such as temperature and pressure) will
influence a chemical reaction, it is the job of the social theorist to specify
those facts in the social environment that are important.
Tushnet's third argument against the tilt is that "the legal system in
fact has little direct impact on the maintenance of capitalism." 93 This
argument is also a version of functionalism, but it focuses on present
utility versus historical genesis. I accept the facts on which this argument
is based. The utility of law is limited for the most part to routine problem-solving and the provision of a framework within which bargains can
be struck. Given this description, one might ask how an institution with
so limited a purpose could have any systematic impact.94 Although I
would not put the query that strongly, it does not follow that the system
has no tilt. The underlying premise seems to be that unless the law is
totally efficacious in maintaining the system, then it is not important to
the system. However, I cannot think of a social theory in which this type
of proposition is decisive. It is perfectly plausible to say that powers
which are seldom used and have little daily impact can still be strategically important. A perfectly plausible social theory could distinguish between forces which maintain a system on a day-to-day basis and those
which maintain in moments of crisis. On a day-to-day basis, the predominant institutions include the family, the school, the media, the factory,
and the office. These can be regarded as the frontline troops, with the
forces of the law serving as a strategic reserve. The military metaphor
illuminates the issue nicely, for battles cannot be won without both.
Another problem with Tushnet's three arguments is that they contradict theses that are part of CLS criticisms of the law and economics
movement. 95 Tushnet reports that the CLS critique of law and economics
is comprised of a three-pronged attack. Law and economics theorists
suppose that distribution is a function of efficiency. CLS criticizes this
outlook because legal rules create entitlements which delimit the distribution of wealth. If this is a valid critique, does it not presuppose that the
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id. at 512.
Id. at 508.
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rules have in fact been efficacious by creating entitlements, and thus
wealth? If so, does not law have a present utility? A second CLS critique
is that the economic models are unrealistic. But does not this presume a
considerable historical knowledge about social reality? Finally, the CLS
approach rejects the notion that a set of rules can be constructed that
reflect individual preferences, for the rules themselves shape preferences.
Yet does this not contradict squarely the proposition that legal rules do
not help maintain the existing social structure?
Aside from arguing against law and economics, Tushnet reports that
the dominant trend in CLS does not believe that the legal realist project
of balancing is workable. He states "[i]n our society the class of decisionmakers is not representative enough to provide the assurance the realists
wanted. Decision-makers are elite, demographically unrepresentative and
socialized into a set of beliefs about society and technology that skew the
balance that they reach." 9 6 I accept that description and, in fact, endorse
it heartily. 97 However, the assertion seems to rest on a social theory that
is rather sweeping. If the members of the dominant position are right in
their critique of theory, then both Tushnet and I should be ashamed of
uttering such generalizations.
D. Social Psychology
Reviewing the arguments in Tushnet's article, the contrast between
the CLS critique of law and economics and the critique by the "dominant
CLS position" of the "early position" is truly remarkable. This dominant
position rests upon arguments that are theoretically absurd. Moreover,
they are ignored in practice when the economists are attacked. An explanation for this confusion can be found in the field of social psychology.
Through social psychology we can find social facts that explain why people desire to identify law with rules and principles, and further would
want to see these rules and principles as infinitely malleable. The common education of these academics is an instructive starting point. The
CLS scholars who constitute the dominant position all went to law
school, and it is a characteristic of law school instruction to focus on
doctrine. Furthermore, in the law school environment one is encouraged
to devise arguments for and against, any and every position. The study of
law in our law schools is all too often the study of the production of
novel arguments. Judging from Tushnet's description, it would seem that
96. Id.
97. See supra notes 2-78 and accompanying text.
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some people have inferred that the law as it is studied in law schools is
the same as law as it exists in reality. Since law in the classroom focuses
on the production of arguments, then it must follow that the production
of arguments is the main component of law as it exists in reality.
However, the power of education should not be overestimated.
Surely the facts about family, geography, and social class are more important. Unfortunately, it is bound to seem presumptuous of me to generalize about such matters, since I have not gathered survey data nor
followed any of the prescribed research protocols. On the other hand, I
do have the evidence of my own experience. Based upon that evidence, I
would characterize the scholars in question as white, middle-class, and
suburban in their genesis. My own description is corroborated by a customary CLS self-critique. The members of the CLS movement are aware
of the limitations in vision that hamper their understanding of the world,
and they regularly identify restrictions of race, class, and the lack of heterogeneity in the group as handicapping their insight.
How might this characterization of CLS as predominantly white
and middle-class be linked to a desire to view law as malleable, plastic,
indeterminate? I think that the middle class vision of the world has customarily characterized it as being without structure. Furthermore, the
middle class family also has an image of itself as unstructured. To be
sure, there is massive self-deception in all of this ideology but none of us,
I think, have escaped its influence.9 8 Those who have absorbed an antistructural ideology in their formative years are likely to adhere to it in
later years, and if they study law it is likely that they will carry these
biases into their vision of the law.
We should inquire into the social psychology that lies behind our
most fundamental assumptions. If we do, we can criticize ourselves. If we
can understand ourselves as the products of history, then we can understand our law as a product of history.
V.

CONCLUSION

I do not advance any broad social theory in this Article. However, I
do have a theory about law. Law is a particular way of using texts and
98. I do not exclude myself, of course, but some of my own life experiences have been a partial
corrective. I have lived among those who used the phrase "the law" to refer to the sheriff, and when
one spoke of the sheriff directly, he was referred to as "the high sheriff." Furthermore, these idioms
were not merely metaphorical, but were socially accurate. It was understood, and accurately so, that
the high sheriff's word was final on a wide range of matters. I have found it useful to recommend
such experience as an antidote to the proposition that the law is comprised of rules and principles.
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precedents, and there are many ways of using these tools. It is an empirical rather than a theoretical question as to which techniques of using
precedent prevail in any particular historical context. In some contexts,
lawyers and judges use texts to generate rules. In other historical contexts, the practice of using texts and precedents yields a process of practical judgments about what is good for social well-being. The
determination of which practice actually occurs is a question for historical investigation.
I also have presented some historical judgments. Suppose that during a study of constitutional law one asks: "Which kind of law is it? Is
constitutional law the practice of judges using precedents to generate
rules and principles, to which they then adhere? Or is constitutional law
the practice of judges using precedent to inform (but not control) their
practical judgments about what is good?" As an empirical matter, one
finds some of both, but the latter predominates. The so-called great cases
are examples of practical judgments, not rule-bound reasoning. Consequently, it is uninteresting to prove that the principles of constitutional
law are indeterminate and contradictory for the cases rest on a different
foundation.
Finally, I assert that we must be alert to changes in law. Tushnet has
described his book on the law of slavery as ahistorical because his subject
matter did not change significantly during the fifty year period that he
surveyed.9 9 I concede to Tushnet the right to describe his own book, but
I did not read it that way. At any rate, there have been significant
changes in constitutional law, and the three cases that I have discussed
- Presser, Spies, and Debs - are examples of change in law. Furthermore, the changes in law symbolized by these cases were connected with
the other social and political changes that were occurring at that time.
I will close with one example of change embodied in Presser. In that
case, the Supreme Court endorsed the changes that were underway in
other courts in which the right to bear arms was being limited. °" During
these same years, the power of the jury to make final resolutions of a
controversy was eliminated.' 0 1 Furthermore, freedom of speech was also
sharply restricted. 2 These changes go together if they are viewed in
99. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 512 n.21.
100. For a survey of the historical precedents on this issue, see S. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY
MAN BE ARMED (1984) and E. KRUSCHKE, THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS (1985).
101. See LaRue, A Jury of One's Peers, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 864-65 (1976); see also
supra notes 30-56 and accompanying text (discussing Debs).
102. See Rabban, The First Amendment in its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L. J. 514 (1981); see
also supra notes 16-29 and accompanying text (discussing Spies).
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their historical context. The nineteenth century was a time of change.
Different classes gained and lost unequally, which led to social unrest.
Judges responded to these events by attempting to impose order. In this
historical context the disarming of unions, the reduction of jury autonomy, the expansion of the injunction, and the restriction of radical
speech form a coherent pattern. We can understand the pattern of these
judicial actions as natural human responses. The judges changed law in
an attempt to deal with events thought to be serious threats to the social
order in which they had a stake and to which they pledged loyalty.

